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would lead, therefore, to a complete denial of the ex-wife's claim to a
portion of her ex-husband's military retirement pay.
The preemption question has not yet been considered by a federal court
construing the consent statute in light of the 1977 clarification statute.
Those federal courts which have considered the consent statute have concluded that enforcement of a state divorce decree, under the statute, is a
state right over which the federal courts have no jurisdiction."
United States v. Stelter exemplifies the Texas trend toward advancing
the ex-wife's position by providing her with an effective means of securing
her court awarded portion of the federal retirement pay. The clarification
statute, however, denies her this remedy by excluding community property
settlements from the federal consent statute. Because Texas is the only
community property state without permanent alimony, the statute discriminates against Texas residents. It is possible, however, that military
retirement pay will be excluded from the terms of the clarification statute
should the United States Supreme Court decide that the state community
property law classification conflicts with the federal courts' classification
of such benefits as gratuities. For the present, however, the 1977 clarification statute seems to deny a Texas divorcee the right to bring suit against
the federal government under the federal consent statute. This removes the
effective means provided by Stelter for recovering the divorcee's court
awarded share of military retirement pay.
Howard E. Strackbein
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Delegation of AuthorityThe Legislature Cannot Delegate to the Judiciary
the Power to Fix Court Reporter's Fees
Absent Sufficient Standards
or Guidelines

In re Johnson,
554 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed).
The city of Ingleside perfected its appeal to the court of civil appeals
54. Matin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230, 1231 (5th Cir. 1977) (any right under the consent
statute is a state right); Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 165
(S.D. Tex. 1976) (court balanced construction of statute to give full effect to its underlying
purpose against preservation of state's right to administer matters properly within its domain); see Morrison v. Morrison, 408 F. Supp. 315, 318 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (actions for garnishment as enforcement of child support obligations properly belong in state court).
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following an adverse trial court judgment in an action in quantum meruit.1
Martin A. Johnson, the official court reporter for the 156th Judicial District, prepared a statement of facts to be used in the city's appeal.' The
city of Ingleside, by written notice, objected to the fees charged by the
3
court reporter pursuant to article 2324 of the Civil Statutes. Johnson then
requested a hearing before the trial judge in order to have his fee approved
as reasonable. The city responded contending that article 2324 was unconstitutional and arguing that Johnson's fee was unreasonable. The trial
judge approved the court reporter's fee as reasonable. An appeal was then
perfected by the city to the Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals.
Held-Reversed and remanded. Article 2324 of the Civil Statutes violates
article II, section 1 and article III, section 44 of the Texas Constitution by
delegating to the judiciary the legislature's exclusive compensation setting
function without establishing sufficient standards.'
Article H, section 1 of the Texas Constitution divides governmental powers into three separate and equal branches: legislative, executive, and judi1. The original case action was brought by T.R. Stewart for labor and materials used in
the remodeling of a city building. City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed) (appeal from original case action).
2. Prior to the time the appeal was submitted, the city brought an original mandamus
proceeding in the court of civil appeals to require the court reporter to deliver the statement
of facts. The court reporter had refused to deliver the statement of facts until his fee had been
paid in full and in advance. The court of civil appeals issued the writ of mandamus. See City
of Ingleside v. Johnson, 537 S.W.2d 145, 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
3. TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977) provides in part:
When any party to any suit reported by any such reporter shall desire a transcript of
the evidence in said suit, such party may apply for same by written demand, and the
reporter shall make up such transcript and shall receive as compensation therefor a
reasonable amount, subject to the approval of the judge of the court if objection is
made thereto, taking into consideration the difficulty and technicality of the material
to be transcribed and the time within which the transcript is requested to be prepared. . . . Provided, however, that the Supreme Court of Texas under its rulemaking
authority shall provide for the duties and fees of court reporters in all civil judicial
proceedings, except as provided by law.
4. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed).
Article 2324 was also held to be "subject to unequal application" in violation of TEx. CONST.
art. III, § 56 because the charges made were dependent upon each court reporter's personal
fee schedule and each trial court's idea of a "reasonable amount." The court refused to
address the due process issue, and also abstained from ruling on the authority granted to the
supreme court by either article 2324 or article 1731a. This abstention was in deference to
the supreme court which had not yet exercised the authority so granted. In re Johnson,
554 S.W.2d 775, 783-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed). The court stated
that an official court reporter could be considered a business affecting the public interest and
as such the compensation received for transcribing the record could constitute a form of
ratemaking of fees or charges for a professional service. If considered ratemaking, it is a
function belonging exclusively to the legislature. Id. at 784. The court also held that there
was insufficient evidence to support the trial judge's ruling as to the reasonableness of the
fee charged. Id. at 786-88.
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cial. 5 No branch may exercise any power exclusively reserved for the others.6 Exclusive legislative powers, therefore, may not be delegated by the
legislature absent express constitutional authority.7 The legislature is permitted to delegate judicial duties to the courts,' but not legislative functions' such as ratemaking."
Although inherent exclusive powers of general legislation may not be
delegated, many powers possessed by the legislature are delegable." The
legislature may delegate to another body powers that it cannot itself
"practically and efficiently exercise."' 2 It may also delegate the power to
make rules implementing complete laws that have been enacted. 3 In such
circumstances, the policy and principles applicable to the law must be
expressed by the lawmakers.' The authority to determine the facts and
conditions upon which the policy and principles are to operate may then
be delegated. 5 If the statute suffices to regulate legislative matters, the
5. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 (separation of powers clause).
6. Id.
7. Texas Nat'l Guard Armory Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 627, 126 S.W.2d 627, 635
(1939); Trimmier v. Carlton. 116 Tex. 572, 590-91, 296 S.W. 1070, 1079 (1927); see Daniel v.
Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co., 127 Tex. 213, 220, 93 S.W.2d 372, 375 (1936); TEX. CONST. art. II, §
1.
8. See Jones v. Alexander, 122 Tex. 328, 335-36, 59 S.W.2d 1080, 1082 (1933); Ex parte
Davis, 85 Tex. Crim. 218, 219, 211 S.W. 456, 457 (1919); Lacy v. Lacy, 122 S.W.2d 1104, 1105
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1938, no writ); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1.
9. See Daniel v. Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co., 127 Tex. 213, 220, 93 S.W.2d 372, 375-76
(1936); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 523 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin),
modified and afj'd, 526 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1975); TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
10. State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1975); Lone Star Gas
Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 302, 153 S.W.2d 681, 693, mandamus denied sub. nom. Ex parte
Texas, 315 U.S. 8 (1941); Daniel v. Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co., 127 Tex. 213, 220, 93 S.W.2d
372, 375-76 (1936). Ratemaking for a business affecting the public interest is a legislative
power which may be delegated to an agency, board, or commission. The rates charged are
subject to judicial review. Courts declaring rates unreasonable or illegal, however, cannot set
the rate. State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1975); Daniel v.
Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co., 127 Tex. 213, 220, 93 S.W.2d 372, 375-76 (1936).
11. See, e.g., Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 344-45, 198 S.W.2d 424, 438 (1946)
(delegation to Railroad Commission); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 172, 143
S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940) (delegation of power to determine necessity of taking particular land
under eminent domain); Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (delegation of authority to set probation officers'
salaries).
12. Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 344, 198 S.W.2d 424, 438 (1946); Housing Auth.
v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 171, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940); Texas Nat'l Guard Armory
Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 627, 126 S.W.2d 627, 635 (1939).
13. Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 171, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940); Trimmier v. Carlton, 116 Tex. 572, 591, 296 S.W.1070, 1079 (1927).
14. See Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 172, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940);
Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
15. See Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 344-45, 198 S.W.2d 424, 438 (1946); Housing
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details necessary for the actual "application, operation, and enforcement"
of the statute may be delegated."6
Texas law dictates that a delegating statute contain sufficient standards. 7 The constitutional test regarding legislative delegation of authority is whether "sufficient standards" have been provided to guide the
power conferred." The delegation is valid and the authority conferred is
not deemed legislative if sufficient guidelines have been provided. General standards are permissible, as long as they are "capable of reasonable
application."' 0
The duty to provide for compensation of public officers rests solely with
the legislature.2' It is well settled, however, that the responsibility of establishing the exact amount of compensation may be constitutionally delegated.2 Although the courts have required sufficient standards in order for
such delegation to be valid, 2 no particular set of standards has been preAuth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 172, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940); Commissioners Court
v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. Ex parte Naylor, 157 Tex. Crim. 355, 358-59, 249 S.W.2d 607, 609 (1952); Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
17. E.g., Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Falkner, 160 Tex. 417, 422, 331 S.W.2d 917,
921 (1960); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 172, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940);
Moody v. City of University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912, 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
Foreign jurisdictions are not uniform in their treatment of statutes delegating to the
judiciary the authority to set compensation of public officers. In Warren v. Marion County,
353 P.2d 257, 261 (Or. 1960), noted in 14 STAN. L. REV. 372 (1962) such a delegation was
upheld absent standards. In State v. County Court, 78 S.E.2d 569 (W. Va. 1953) a statute
authorizing the judiciary to appoint probation personnel and fix their compensation within
minimum and maximum amounts was declared an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. Id. at 577. Effect has been given to statutes which delegate to the judiciary the
authority to set compensation, subject to the approval of certain designated bodies. See
Birdsall v. Pima County, 475 P.2d 250, 252 (Ariz. 1970); Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738, 74142 (Colo. 1963); Bass v. County of Saline, 106 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Neb. 1960).
18. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Moody v. City of University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912, 921 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. Moody v. City of University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912, 921-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1955, writ refd n.r.e.).
20. See Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 172, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940);
Moody v. City of University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ
refd n.r.e.).
21. Tax. CONST. art. III, § 44 provides in part: "The Legislature shall provide by law for
the compensation of all officers, servants, agents and public contractors, not provided for in
" Id.
this Constitution ..
22. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1955, writ refd n.r.e.); Burkhart v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist.,
42 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
23. See Commissioners Court v. Martin, 417 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ refd n.r.e.); Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
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scribed. While some Texas courts have found minimum and maximum
limitations on the amounts of compensation sufficient to uphold the authority delegated,2" it has also been held that such limitations are not
constitutionally mandated. 5
An official court reporter's annual salary is expressed, by judicial district, in articles 2326-2326o.26 This statute has been upheld as properly
delegating authority to the judiciary of the power to set court reporters'
compensation." Additionally, the legislature has provided that an official
court reporter's salary may be increased by a maximum of ten per cent per
annum. 8 The court reporter may supplement his salary by receiving compensation for transcribing and preparing trial records under article 2324.9
In In re Johnson0 the Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals considered
whether article 2324 constituted an unlawful delegation of the exclusive
legislative power to prescribe the fees, duties and compensation of public
officers.3 ' Central to the resolution of this issue was the sufficiency of the
standards provided in article 2324. The court recognized that a delegating
statute must establish sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary and unequal application of the fees charged by court reporters. 2 General standards, if capable of reasonable application, would be sufficient, provided
Worth 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Burkhart v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 42 S.W.2d
96, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
24. See Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Burkhart v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 42 S.W.2d 96, 100
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
25. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2326-2326o (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1976-1977). These
statutes utilize minimum and maximum limitations.
27. Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1955,
writ refd n.r.e.).
28. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3912k, § 3(c) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). This provision allows the annual compensation to be increased in excess of ten per cent with the
approval of the commissioners court of each county in the judicial district. Id.
29. Id. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
30. 554 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed).
31. The court stated that an official court reporter is an officer of the state as provided
under TEX. CONST. art. III, § 44. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1977, writ filed); see Butcher v. Tinkle, 183 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Dunn v. Allen, 63 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1933, no writ). But see Lightfoot v. Lane, 104 Tex. 447, 449, 140 S.W. 89, 90
(1911) (court reporter is employee of state and not officer within article 4854, § 14 (construing
Pickle v. Finley, 91 Tex. 484, 44 S.W. 480 (1898)); Harris County v. Hunt, 388 S.W.2d 459,
467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, no writ) (court reporter not officer within meaning of
TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 61); Tom Green County v. Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1946, no writ) ("court reporter or stenographer is not a public officer within
the meaning of the Constitution"); Robertson v. Ellis County, 84 S.W. 1097, 1098-99 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1905, no writ) (court reporter not officer within Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 30).
32. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed).
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the limits of the authority conferred were expressed., Under this criteria,
the standards expressed in article 2324 were held to be "entirely too subjective to preclude arbitrary and unequal fees from being charged." 3 ' The
statute, therefore, was declared to be unconstitutional."5
The court reasoned that under article 2324 absolute discretion was given
to the court reporter and the trial judge in setting the fees, subject only to
the "difficulty and technicality of the material and the time within which
the transcript was requested to be prepared."3 Furthermore, the reporter
was given legislative authority to set whatever fee was obtainable, provided
no objection was made to the fee charged.37 When an appellant objected
to the fee, the only legislative guideline provided was "reasonableness.""
Under the circumstances, the court felt that "reasonableness" was not a
sufficient standard to guide the trial judge's discretion3 and stated that
the legislature must establish some objective standards by which the costs
can be determined before the duty of fixing the charges may be delegated."0
Without such standards, the law becomes unconstitutional."
Texas courts have infrequently addressed statutes delegating the authority to set compensation for public officers.'" In re Johnson is the first
case to declare such a delegating statute unconstitutional due to insufficient standards. 3 While the consensus is that sufficient standards or guide33. Id. at 782.
34. Id. at 782. The court noted that article 2324 allowed appellants to be charged different fees for comparable transcripts depending upon which court and county were involved.
Id. at 784. Testimony indicated a range in charges from $1.60 per page to $2.00 per page in
local district courts for comparable transcripts. Id. at 784. The court expressed concern with
the official court reporter system in Texas, noting that over one-half of the court's appeals in
1976 involved at least a one month delay due to the court reporter's failure to prepare the
record within the time specified by law. Id. at 785-86.
35. Id. at 783. The court held paragraph 3 of article 2324 to be unconstitutional and
reinstated paragraph 3 of the 1961 amendment to article 2324. Id. at 787.
36. Id. at 782. The court stated that these subjective standards had no relationship to
the court reporter's actual cost and that the "time requirements" were unclear. Id. at 782.
37. Id. at 782.
38. Id. at 782.
39. Id. at 782. The constitution requires more guidance in the delegation of authority to
set court reporters' fees than the term "reasonableness," which is subject to each judge's
different interpretation. See id. at 782.
40. Id. at 783.
41. Id. at 783.
42. See Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ refd n.r.e.); Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Burkhart v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 42 S.W.2d
96, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ). These cases have addressed the delegation
of compensation setting authority.
43. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed).
Earlier cases considering the issue consistently upheld the statutes. See cases cited note 42
supra.
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lines are required in delegating statutes," what constitutes a sufficient
standard has not been clearly defined. In holding article 2324 to be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, In re Johnson reaffirmed the constitutional mandate that delegating statutes limit and guide
the authority granted through standards capable of reasonable application.
Past decisions have upheld the delegation of authority to set the compensation of public officers within certain limits." In Wichita County v.
5
Griffin"
the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals upheld a statute delegating
to district judges the authority to fix court reporters' salaries within prescribed limits. 7 The court felt that such a delegation was constitutional
when the limits of authority granted were expressed in the delegating
statute.48 Again, in Burkhart v. Brazos River HarborNavigationDistrict,"'
a statute delegating authority to navigation commissioners to set the compensation of tax assessors was upheld with a maximum limitation. 0 The
Burkhart court reasoned that because of the limitation, the statute delegated only administrative and ministerial duties, and not legislative authority." These cases indicate the necessity of adequate standards in statutes delegating compensation setting functions in Texas. Had the limits
of authority not been expressed in the statutes, the cases indicate that the
authority delegated may have been legislative and thus unlawful.2
The Johnson decision is significant in light of Commissioners Court v.
Martin.3 In Martin the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals upheld a statute
delegating to district judges the authority, "with the advice and consent
of the commissioners court," to employ and fix the salaries of probation
officers.5 The delegating statute expressed the desired caseload for proba44. See cases cited note 17 supra.
45. See Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1955, writ refd n.r.e.); Burkhart v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 42 S.W.2d 96, 100
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ). But see Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471
S.W.2d 100, 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
46. 284 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1955, writ ref d n.r.e.).
47. Id. at 256.
48. Id. at 256.
49. 42 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
50. Id. at 100.
51. Id. at 100.
52. See Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1955, writ refrd n.r.e.); Burkhart v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 42 S.W.2d 96, 100
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
53. 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
54. See id. at 106; TEx. CODE CraM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.12, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
The statutory phrase "with the advise and consent of the Commissioners Court" is not a
standard, but a safeguard. The district judges should seek the advice of the Commissioners Court so that the judges may have the information necessary to determine a proper
probation program. The "consent" required is to budget, appropriate and pay the expenditures established by the judges so long as the expenditures are necessary and reasonable to
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tion officers, the requisite qualifications for the office, and the source of

probation funds.5 After recognizing the necessity for sufficient standards,
the court declared that the constitution does not require minimum or
maximum limits to be enumerated in the law." The court then upheld the
standards expressed as sufficient to guide the discretion conferred upon the
district judges.57
The Amarillo court in Martin reasoned that probation compensation
must vary in the different judicial districts because of differing requirements on probation officers." Since the legislature could not practically
and efficiently exercise the power of setting the compensation, the court
felt that the power had been wisely delegated."'
Although several distinctions may be made between Johnson and
Martin, each case involved the same basic issues." Both courts were confronted with statutes delegating to the judiciary the authority to set the
compensation of public officers. In addition, both cases dealt with the
sufficiency of standards expressed in statutes delegating compensation
setting ft.,ictions. The same rules of law were used by both courts to reach
opposing decisions." These contrary holdings appear to result from differdischarge the essential business of the court. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d
100, 107-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
In any dispute regarding the necessity and reasonableness of the expenditures of the
probation program, the court held that the Commissioners Court bears the burden of proof
to show that the judges' actions are so unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious as to be an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 108. Additionally, Commissioners Court v. District Judge, 22nd Judicial
District, 506 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App-Austin 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) held that the statutory phrase "advise and consent of the Commissioners Court" did not confer upon the commissioners veto power, nor did the Commissioners Court have authority to prepare its own
budget in lieu of the budget prepared by the district judges. Id. at 635.
55. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ refd n.r.e.); see TEx. CODE CalM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.12, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 19761977).
56. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Burkhart v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist.,
42 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
57. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. Id. at 105.
59. Id. at 105-06.
60. Johnson concerned the delegation of authority to set court reporters' fees. See In re
Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed). The statute
delegated the authority to set the fee to the court reporter subject to approval of the fee by
the district judge only if it had been objected to. TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon
Supp. 1976-1977). The statute in Martin concerned delegation of authority to set the salary
of probation officers. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1971, writ refd n.r.e.). The authority was delegated directly to the district
judges. TEX. CODE CraM. PRo. ANN. art. 42.12, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).

61. Compare In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 780-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1977, writ rerd n.r.e.) with Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tex. Civ.
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ing interpretations of the term "sufficient standards."
The standards approved in Martin did not provide guidance or limitations to aid the district judge in exercising the discretion conferred.'2 They
provided no more guidance than the standards held insufficient in
Johnson. 3 The Johnson court stated that the delegating statute "must
establish some objective basis" to enable the judge to determine what
would be a reasonable charge." Under this rule, the subjective standards
in the Martin statute would appear to be insufficient." Past cases have
upheld statutes delegating authority to set salaries provided the limits of
the authority granted were established." Martin, in effect, disregarded this
requirement and upheld a statute containing no limitations on the granted
authority. 7 The result appears to be a difference of opinion in the Texas
Courts of Civil Appeals as to the standards which are required in statutes
delegating compensation setting authority.
The Johnson court indicated that one solution may be to follow the
national trend and fix court reporters' rates on a per page basis with a fixed
average number of words per page." This approach would establish an
objective basis for the district judge to determine the reasonableness of a
reporter's fee.6 ' The court refrained, however, from adopting these standards, leaving that determination to the legislature."'
In declaring the third paragraph of article 2324 unconstitutional, the
Johnson court reinstated paragraph 3 of the 1961 amendment to article
2324." This prior law contains objective standards which permit court
reporters to charge thirty cents per hundred words for preparing the original trial transcript.72 In today's economy this compensation is wholly inadApp.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Unlike Johnson, the court in Martin upheld the
delegation because the legislature could not practically and efficiently set the compensation;
this rule does not, however, obviate the necessity of sufficient standards in the delegating
statute.
62. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.12, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
63. Compare TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977) with TEx.
CODE CrIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.12, § 10 (Vernon Supp, 1976-1977).
64. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed).
65. Compare id. at 783 with TEX.,CODE CraM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.12, § 10 (Vernon Supp.
1976-1977).
66. See Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Burkhart v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 42 S.W.2d 96, 100
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, no writ).
67. See Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ refd n.r.e.); TEx. CODE CraM. PRo. ANN. art. 42.12, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
68. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed).
69. See id. at 783.

70. Id. at 783; see State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1975).

71. In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed);

see 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 290, § 1, at 620.
72. See 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 290, § 1, at 620.
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equate." Until action is taken on court reporters' fees, either by the supreme court or the legislature, reporters in the Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District will be receiving this inadequate compensation under the
holding in Johnson.
The 1961 amendment to article 2324 also allows court reporters to make
a reasonable charge for postage, reproduction of exhibits and other actual
expenses." It does so with language practically identical to that declared
unconstitutional in Johnson.7" In reinstating the prior law, the Johnson
court indicated that it considers "reasonableness" a sufficient standard in
regard to court reporters' actual expenses.7"
The Texas Supreme Court, under its constitutional rulemaking authority," has recently acted upon several of the issues addressed in Johnson
concerning court reporters' fees and statements of facts. 8 In compliance
73. A survey of five official court reporters of civil district courts in San Antonio, Texas
indicated that the present rate of compensation is approximately seventy-five to eighty cents
per hundred words. All the reporters stated that thirty cents per hundred words is totally
inadequate and would not cover the court reporter's overhead costs.
74. See 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 290, § 1, at 620.
75. Compare Tim. Rzv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977) (paragraph
3), with 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 290, § 1, at 620.
76. See In re Johnson, 554 S.W.2d 775, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ
filed).
77. Article 2324 authorizes the Texas Supreme Court, under its rulemaking authority,
to provide for the duties and fees of court reporters..See Tzx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324
(Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). This rulemaking authority is derived from TEx. CONST. art. V, §
25 which provides: "The Supreme Court shall have power to make and establish rules of
procedure not inconsistent with the laws of the State for the government of said court and
the other courts of this State to expedite the dispatch of business therein." In 1941 the
legislature relinquished full rulemaking power in civil judicial proceedings to the supreme
court by repealing all laws dealing with practice and procedure. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1731a (Vernon 1962).
The power of the supreme court to make rules is the exercise of legislative power under
a direct grant by the constitution, and such rules have all the effect of statutes. See Brown
v. Linkenhoger, 153 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.);
Childress v. Robinson, 161 S.W. 78, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, writ ref'd). The
authority granted is limited, and only matters of practice and procedure are included in
article 1731a. Moritz v. Byerly, 185 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd);
see Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1731a (Vernon 1962); Tax. R. Civ. P. 815.
Johnson left unanswered the question of whether the setting of court reporters' fees is a
matter of "practice and procedure." The purpose of article 1731a is to expedite the adjudication of the litigants' rights and to avoid unnecessary expense. See C.E. Duke's Wrecker Serv.,
Inc. v. Oakley, 526 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 340 S.W.2d 548, 554 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tax. R. Civ. P. 1. With the purpose of article 1731a
thus stated, it would appear that "practice and procedure" embraces the setting of court
reporters' fees. See Reedus v. Friedman, 287 So. 2d 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The Florida
court held the fixing of court reporters' fees to be a matter of practice and procedure. Id. at
358.
78. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 377 (statement of facts), as amended July 11, 1977, effective
January 1, 1978.
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